Introduction
There are many uncertainties pertaining to the law of liens in South Africa. These include the real operation of a lien, the question whether a mala fide possessor can rely on a lien for money spent or work done on a thing which he knew he controlled unlawfully, the circumstances under which the lienholder has sufficient physical control over an immovable thing, the effect of involuntary loss of control over the thing by the lienholder and, finally, the influence of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 on the validity of a lien in specific instances. In this article I focus on the following concern raised by Van Zyl J 1 in ABSA Bank Ltd t/a
Bankfin v Stander t/a CAW Paneelkloppers:
2 Sonnekus is critical (at 464-9) of the reference to a lien as a 'right' rather than a 'competence' or a 'power'. He describes it (at 467) as a 'power to withhold' ('terughoudingsbevoegdheid') arising from a claim on whatever ground and (at 469) rejects the distinction between enrichment liens and debtor and creditor liens as real and personal rights respectively. His argument is persuasive and it would appear that the distinction should be reconsidered.
In view of the above I first consider the different approaches to liens in South
African law before providing a brief overview of liens in Roman law. This is followed by a discussion of a lien -as a (subjective) right 3 -as a defence and as a capacity to withhold. By way of conclusion I make some suggestions pertaining to the legal nature of a lien in South African law.
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and legal literature pertaining to the nature of a lien. In this sense a lien is described as (i) a right 6 (a personal right, a real right, 7 a limited real right or a real security 
Right to withhold in Roman law
In Roman law the term retentio was used in various contexts, inter alia as the keeping or holding back of a thing, remembrance, to maintain a certain factual situation, and a legal institution for compensation. 13 In the course of Roman legal development, three forms of real security rights were known: fiducia cum creditore, pignus and hypotheca.
14 Retention of the thing was a type of security for the enforcement of a claim. The maxim minus est actionem habere quam rem (it is less satisfying to have an action than to be in control of a thing) 15 applied. Julian 16 thus states that it is better to be in control of a thing and to wait than to claim from the debtor. In Roman law a right of retention was allowed at classical law: the defendant, who had made necessary or useful expenses on a thing, could resist the ownerʹs rei vindicatio with the exceptio doli (defence). 17 The exceptio doli is a defence based on reasonableness that can be raised against a debtor who claims his thing, knowing that he himself still has to perform. Recognition of a lien was based on the principle of fairness (aequitas). 18 The operation of a lien was very simple:
when a debtor reclaimed his thing with the rei vindicatio from the creditor (the lienholder), the latter could either return the thing or ask the praetor for an exceptio doli if the debtor had not fulfilled his obligation. One of two possible orders could be made:
temporary dismissal of the rei vindicatio whereafter the debtor had to perform before he could later institute the rei vindicatio again, M WIESE PER / PELJ 2014(17)6
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(ii) the debtorʹs rei vindicatio was granted conditionally, thus the debtorʹs claim for the return of his thing was granted on condition that he performed first.
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The exceptio doli is therefore the basis from which liens developed further.
Classification of liens in South African law
I now briefly consider the most significant judgments and literature dealing with the classification of a lien as a right (jus/ius), a defence or the capacity (power) to withhold. The judge 23 decided in favour of Golombick. This judgment declared that a lien as a real right enjoys preference over a registered mortgage bond over the property in question. Although this is an oft-quoted judgment and the conclusion is correct, the reason for this outcome is wrong. It can also be criticised on various grounds: the judge often made statements without reference to any authority; he contradicted himself and regularly used phrases like "we think", "it well may be" and "we doubt".In this specific part of his judgment the judge seems fairly unsure of the legal position and referred to no authority for his statement that an enrichment lien is a real right. 24 Consequently, I argue that this judgment is not conclusive authority for the statement that a lien is a real right. The judgeʹs reference to "possession in a legal sense" also creates the impression that he might even regard possession as a right. Authors like Sonnekus and Neels 25 and Kleyn 26 indicate that possession is not a right. According to these authors possession is a factual physical relationship between a person and a thing and therefore it cannot be a right. They further explain that this factual situation is a legally recognised and protected relationship.
Right (jus/ius)
They consider possession as a legal fact to which the law attaches certain consequences.
Possibly due to a misunderstanding of the nature of a lien, the judge thought that the only way in which he could protect Golombick in the circumstances (due to the insolvency of Smookler) was to regard a lien as a real right. On appeal Nienaber JA 41 formulated the legal question as follows:
[W]hether the respondent's admitted debtor and creditor lien against Canadian Gold extended to the appellant, a non-contracting party, on the ground that the appellant was aware of, consented to and authorised the respondent to conduct its excavating activities on the appellant's property -this was essentially the issue on which the Court a quo found in favour of the respondent …
The Judge 42 then referred to the classification of liens into enrichment liens and debtor and creditor liens and declared the former to be real rights, but not the latter. 
Literature
In academic literature as well as several judgments the term "right" (jus/ius) is used to describe a lien.The term "right" can have various meanings. I now briefly discuss some definitions of a "right" in order to determine the exact meaning of the term "right" in "right of retention".
Van der Vyver and Van Zyl 47 distinguish between seven different depictions of the term "right". Only two of these are relevant for the current discussion. First, a "right"
can be defined as the unity of relationships between a legal subject and the legal object and all other legal subjects regarding the legal object. For example: I have a right (eg ownership) over a horse. This is the generally accepted description of a right. 48 Secondly, a "right" can be defined as a legal subjectʹs entitlement (geoorloofdheid) to deal with his thing in a certain manner, for example to use and enjoy it. This could be explained as the ownerʹs right to ride his horse, in other words, it describes the content of his right. The correct term here is "entitlement".
The authors 49 distinguish between a legal capacity or competence (kompetensie), namely the capacity to participate in legal commerce, and an entitlement (bevoegdheid), namely the entitlement to use a legal object in a certain manner. In order to get to the core of the meaning of a "right" Van Warmelo 53 explains that the law (objektiewe reg) grants a right (subjektiewe reg) to a legal subject. The author 54 indicates that there are four elements to a right: it must enure to the benefit of a legal subject, there must be a legal object (a thing, value or interest) to which the right pertains, there must be an abstract legal relationship between the The authors distinguish the following three elements of a right: its nature, its formation and its legal effect. With this in mind the authors then define a right as:
Hahlo and Kahn
... an interest conferred by, and protected by the law, entitling one person to claim that another person or persons either give him something, or do an act for him, or refrain from doing an act. [My emphasis.] In terms of this definition a right is an interest derived from and protected by the Sonnekus and Neels 63 explain that a right in terms of the subjective-rights theory is a relationship between the entitled person and other legal subjects (the subjectsubject relationship) in regard to a certain legal object (the subject-object If one regards liens as rights and has to categorise them with reference to their objects, all liens should be classified as real rights since the object of the right is a thing. Liens can therefore also not be classified as personal rights, since the object of a personal right is performance. Although the lienholder has a personal right against the debtor for performance, depending on the circumstances, this right originates from either a contractual agreement or enrichment. In my opinion
Sonnekus correctly indicates that a lien cannot in some instances qualify as a real right and in other cases as a personal right.
Although a lien appears to have elements of a right in the above sense, taking into consideration the subject-subject relationship, as well as the subject-object relationship, other elements of a right should also be considered. a security function, it is not a right because it grants the lienholder no active entitlements to the thing in his control.
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In the light of the above approach the term "right" in "right of retention" to my mind is used in a loose and imprecise way referring to an interest protected by the law. I agree with Sonnekus and Neels that it is not a right at all. Therefore, it can also neither be a real right 75 nor a personal right. 76 I now consider the proposition that a lien is a defence. Furthermore we doubt whether it is correct to say ... that the jus retentionis is a mere weapon of defence, for we think that if a person exercising that right were forcibly dispossessed he might make use of it as a weapon of offence in an action for spoliation.
Again, as so often in this judgment, the judge was uncertain ("we doubt") of the correctness of the proposition that a lien is a mere defence. His subsequent exposition of the legal position is also completely wrong and provides no explanation of why a lien is not a defence. The spoliation remedy does not protect a lien; it protects a personʹs control over a thing. The spoliation remedy therefore protects a factual situation, not a right. If control is taken from a lienholder against her will, she "terughoudingsbevoegdheid" can be translated as "capacity to withhold", because the law grants this defence. Capacity is used here not in the technical sense described by Sonnekus and Neels, but in the meaning of the ability to withhold granted by the law.
Practical implications
This "new" approach to liens is not only of academic value, but has practical non-owner (a debtor) claims a thing from her creditor, the creditor should rely on the exeptio non adimpleti contractus.
Therefore a clear distinction should be drawn between the existence of a lien (as a defence against the rei vindicatio) and other rights of retention on the one hand, and the consequences of this distinction both for the parties and third parties affected by the existence of such rights of retention (third party operation):
(i) X, the creditor, has a contract with Y, the debtor, who is not the owner of the thing. When Z claims the thing with rei vindicatio, X can raise the defence that she is entitled to retain control of the thing until her claim (based on enrichment, in other words for necessary and useful expenses) has been satisfied; or
(ii) X, the creditor, has a contract with Z, the owner of the thing. When Z claims the thing with the rei vindicatio, X can rely on the defence that she is entitled to retain the thing until Z has fulfilled her contractual duty to pay (in other words, for all expenses provided for in the contract);
(iii) X, the creditor, has a contract with Y, the debtor, who is not owner of the thing. Without tendering payment of the contractual debt, Y claims return of the thing based on Xʹs contractual duty to return the thing on completion of the work. X can rely on the exceptio non adimpleti contractus to enforce the payment of the expenses agreed upon in the contract before she returns the thing. 
